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Abstract: The motivation for this research is to explore the success behind the Oakland based 
Family Independence Initiative (FII) as a model for poverty alleviation. During the period of 
June-December 2012, nearly 200 small business owners in Medellin, Colombia participated in a 
field experiment intended to replicate the FII model by randomizing the treatments of setting 
goals, receiving conditional payments, and participating in self-help groups, as well as the 
combinations thereof. The data shows that the subjects in the full FII treatment group achieve 
more goals and have significantly higher monthly sales than those subjects in any other 
treatment or control group. Given its success, this research explores the merits of a change in 
subjects’ time preferences as a mechanism explaining the changes in behavior caused by 
participation in the FII program. The subjects’ time preferences were measured via survey using 
a combination of the binary choice and fill-in-the-blank methods on three different occasions 
throughout the experiment. The data indicates that participating in the FII experiment does 
indeed change subject’s time preferences, suggesting they become more patient and less present-
biased over time. Examining how time preferences can change over time is particularly useful 
when discussing poverty alleviation, as inter-temporal choices affect a range of behaviors such as 
saving, borrowing, and various types of investment, all of which affect economic well-being. 
 
The author wishes to thank the Mayor’s Office of Medellin, Colombia, in particular El Banco de las Oportunidades, 
for their partnership in the FII experiment. Thank you to our gracious host family, the enumerators, and the 
participants, without whom this project would not have been possible. A very special thank you goes out to the 
members of Team Colombia and our adviser.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Family Independence Initiative (FII) began in Oakland, California in 2001 
implementing a new and innovative poverty reduction program. The program has since spread 
to cities around the United States, including Boston, San Francisco, and Honolulu. The FII 
shows findings that suggest it is possible to reduce poverty by focusing on the notion of goal 
achievement accompanied by small financial incentives and group support. The FII organizes 
affinity groups made up of low income families of different cultural backgrounds within a 
geographical area, provides them with some helpful tools to succeed in attaining self-set goals, 
and offers an incentive to motivate continued progress in achieving their goals (Castuera et al 
2004). The program aims to act as a bottom-up approach, as it emphasizes family ties and social 
networks over the assistance of professional staff (Miller, 2011).  The organization’s internal 
reports show substantial improvements in welfare in all program locations. The FII states that 
the participants have experienced a 23 percent increase in average household income, a 240 
percent increase in average savings, a 17 percent increase in home ownership, and as well as 
increases in children’s school grades and attendance rates (Miller, 2011; Castuera et al 2004). 
Encouraging accountability, empowerment, and self-starter attitudes seems to have an effect on 
the participants’ behaviors. This indicates that psychological motivators and indicators could 
have an important relationship with economic outcomes, and therefore substantial implications 
for economic development policy both domestically and abroad.   
Given the apparent success of the FII model, a field experiment was conducted in 
Medellin, Colombia in June through December 2012 with the goal of exploring the possible 
reasons for the FII accomplishments. The primary purpose of the FII experiment in Medellin 
was to assess whether the FII framework is indicative of a successful poverty alleviation model 
that can be applied more generally, or whether the success can be attributed to other unknown 
factors or circumstances specific to the areas in which the program has already been 
implemented. More specifically, the FII experiment aimed to assess the extent to which each 
one of the FII components – setting goals, being involved in self-support groups, and receiving 
small economic incentives based on achievement – contributed to the behaviors of participating 
individuals.  
The experimental data from the FII experiment conducted in Medellin not only show 
that subjects in the FII treatment group were more likely to achieve their goals, but provide 
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some evidence that the FII subjects’ businesses experienced higher revenues due to the 
experiment as well. However, these findings are not the focus of this research. Now that it is 
known that FII experiment had a statistically significant impact on the subjects, the next step 
is to assess the potential causes of these behavior changes. The objective of this particular 
research is to understand through which mechanisms the subjects’ attitudes and behaviors were 
affected. While there could be a multitude of factors that affected goal achievement and 
revenues (or lack thereof) among the subjects of this study, this paper will focus on the 
relationship between participating in the FII experiment and changes in the subjects’ time 
preferences.  
Economists have long recognized that people’s perception of time affects how they 
evaluate many decisions in their lives, ranging from economic decisions to decisions about 
health care (Wilson, 2011; Robberstad & Cairns, 2007). It can even affect how one treats the 
natural environment (Kirby et al., 2002). Examining these relationships is particularly useful 
when discussing models for poverty alleviation, as inter-temporal choices affect a range of 
behaviors such as saving, borrowing, and various types of investment (including in education 
and health care), all of which affect economic well-being (Anderson et al., 2004; Camilo et al., 
2008). Because economic development in general is related to time preference, questions now 
arise as to whether or not a person can become more patient, perhaps engendering better 
economic outcomes. This research adds to the growing amount of literature that explores if 
various measurements of time preferences can change over time, and if so, how this occurs. 
Thus the following two research questions are explored: 
 
(1) To what extent does participating in the FII experiment affect measures of the 
subjects’ discount rates?  
(2) To what extent does participating in the FII experiment affect measures of the 
subjects’ present bias? 
 
The findings of this paper illustrate that the subjects in the treatment group 
representing the full FII model did not become more patient, but did exhibit significantly lower 
estimations of present-bias over time as compared to the other treatment and control groups. 
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature on time preferences, economic development, and goal setting. Section 3 examines the 
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sample and methodology. Section 4 discusses the models, hypotheses, and data analysis for the 
two research questions respectively. And finally, the results, policy implications, and 
conclusions will be presented in Section 5.  
 
2. Literature Review 
This section reviews the literature to see what evidence exists to indicate whether or 
not a program like FII could impact participants’ time preferences. It examines specifically 
measurements of present bias and discount rates. While the majority of academics agree that 
time preferences are important factors in decision-making and economic development, there is 
some contention in the field as to the nature of that relationship. To fully explore all of the 
components and previous findings associated with this research, the literature review has been 
divided into four broad topics. First, the theoretical background on time preferences is 
reviewed. Next, the literature on present bias and discount rates and their respective 
associations with economic outcomes will be discussed, in that order. And finally, the literature 
review concludes by remarking on the findings regarding the relationship specifically between 
the various components of the FII model – goals, groups, and incentives – and time preferences.  
 
2.1  Theoretical Modeling of Time Preferences 
Since the seminal works of Irving Fisher (1930) and Paul Samuelson (1937), economists 
have given a lot of explanatory power to time preferences as drivers for individuals decision-
making. Their initial theoretical work involving time preferences came about within the 
context of utility maximization across time periods. It was noted by Samuelson that 
consumption in a future time period is not as valuable as consumption in the current time 
period (1937). In his models of constant discounted utility, Samuelson accounts for these 
differences in preferences across time by incorporating an exponential discounting function that 
discounts the value of consumption in future periods by a constant parameter, the discount rate. 
This work led to what is seen as the traditional form of discounting, the exponential 
discounting model (Hausman, 1979). One of the assumptions of this model is that the marginal 
rate of substitution between two periods only depends on their distance apart in time. In other 
words, the exponential discounting model assumes that discount rates are dynamically 
consistent, where the valuation falls by a constant factor each day regardless of how far into the 
future one looks (Hausman, 1979). This implies that the only difference across individuals is 
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equal to the differences in actual borrowing or lending rates and also that the discount rates for 
the same people across time remain constant  (Fisher, 1930).  
Unfortunately, the majority of the empirical findings suggest that the assumptions 
about time preferences within the exponential discounting model do not hold up in real life 
(Luhmann, 2013; Rohde, 2010;). Herrnstein was one of the first to suggest that time 
preferences could vary over time, stating that the subjective value of consumption in the future 
is likely inversely related to the length of the delay (Chung & Herrnstein, 1967). Richard 
Thaler (1981) was one of the first to present experimental evidence to the contrary of the 
exponential discounting model. In his experiment, subjects were asked to write down the 
amount that would make him or her indifferent to receiving a hypothetical lottery prize now or 
at a specified time in the future. The delay times ranged from three months to ten years. 
Thaler’s results suggest that discount rates are not constant over time, and that they are 
negatively correlated with the length of the delay (1981). The works of Herrnstein and Thaler, 
along with others, inspired an alternative type of discounting, the hyperbolic discount model. 
With hyperbolic discounting, consumption over future time periods is discounted by a 
hyperbolic discount function. Mathematically, this allows for results similar to Thaler’s where 
the valuation falls quickly for a short delay period and more slowly for long delay periods, i.e. 
the discount rate is higher for a shorter delay period than for a longer delay period.  
 
2.2  Present Bias Literature 
In his recent research comparing hyperbolic and exponential discounting models, 
Christian Luhmann states that the majority of studies that have looked for evidence of 
hyperbolic discount functions have at least found the existence present bias (2013). In other 
words, according to Luhmann, most empirical studies have found that preferences do shift in 
the direction expected under hyperbolic discounting, regardless of whether or not the absolute 
values of the discount rates properly fit the exact function (Luhmann 2013). This is an 
important point for this research. While the research questions listed in the introduction of this 
paper are not specifically interested in identifying the exact shape of the subjects’ discount 
function, the assumptions about the shape of the function come into play when assessing 
present bias. Thus, it is useful to examine the empirical comparisons of the models because 
discussing the fit of the models demonstrates what others have found in the way of discount 
rates as a function of delay time, which gives some indication of the existence of present bias in 
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general. In other words, exponential discounting models do not allow for present bias, whereas 
hyperbolic discounting models do. This is because individuals with a hyperbolic discount 
function are more patient in the near future and grow more patient as the delayed rewards get 
further and further away, which is essentially the definition of present bias (Luhmann, 2013). 
Since Herrnstein and Thaler’s works, many economists have done research comparing 
the exponential discounting model to hyperbolic discounting model, and the results are 
somewhat mixed, although they do tend to favor the hyperbolic discounting model or one of it’s 
adaptations. The model comparison is often done by using structural estimation techniques and 
comparing which model best fits the data. Exponential discounting is most commonly used 
theoretical modeling, which makes sense because a similar equation is used by banks to 
calculate compound interest. Glenn Harrison and his colleagues confirm its topicality when 
they show no evidence of discount rates changing over time when conducting a time preference 
experiment on Danes, although several scholars – the authors included – have noted that Danes 
might not be a very representative subject pool (Harrison et al., 2002; Harrison et al, 2004). 
Additionally Anderson, et al. (2004) find evidence from survey and experimental data collected 
in Vietnam that the discount rates vary over variables other than time, such as age and gender. 
These studies imply that no present bias existed among their subjects.  
Many economists have found evidence that the hyperbolic discounting model better fits 
their empirical data. Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) find support for the hyperbolic 
discounting model when using survey and experimental data in Vietnam. Bauyer and Chytilova 
(2010) find similar support in their experimental data from Uganda. Burks and his colleagues 
(2011) compare four different models of time preferences and find that the quasi-hyperbolic 
model outperforms the rest, due to the extensive present-bias found in the data. Additionally 
Luhmann finds that when allowing for various front-end delays in his experiment with 
American college students his data is most consistent with the hyperbolic discounting model, 
although it is not a great fit. Due to this he concludes that individuals’ preferences do exhibit 
present-bias, but not as much as indicated by hyperbolic discounting models, which is a 
common finding among the experimental research (2013). The hyperbolic shape of all of the 
data collected in the aforementioned experiments allows for the assumption that present bias 
existed among their subjects at the time of the experiments.  
As previously mentioned, this paper’s goal is not to extract which discount function best 
describes the subjects in the FII experiment, but rather to assess to what extent present bias 
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exists within the subjects and how that changes over time. The following studies focus on the 
existence of present bias itself rather than the shape of the discount function, much like this 
study does. It is useful to examine present bias, because it is associated with undesirable 
behaviors, such as procrastination, lack of savings, and a higher probability of quitting their job 
(Burks et al., 2011). People with present bias tend to be impatient today and delay undesirable 
tasks to the future, where they imagine themselves to be much more patient (Rohde, 2010). 
However, when the future becomes today, the cycle starts all over. For example, Michal Bauer 
and his colleagues perform a similar study to the FII experiment, except it was conducted in 
rural India. They use the binary choice method to elicit both the subjects’ discount rates and 
measures of present bias (Bauer et al 2012). They consider a subject to be present biased if their 
indifference point in the future choice is at least two choices later than the indifference point in 
the contemporary choice. They find that people with present bias tend to borrow more to make 
up for low levels of savings, even after controlling for measures of patience. When regressing 
present bias on other observables factors, they find no observable or behavioral explanation for 
the existence of present bias in their subjects (Bauer et al., 2012). Tanaka et al. (2010) 
structurally estimate a present bias parameter based on a 75 binary choice protocol in rural 
Vietnam and also do not find any of their observables offer any explanatory power. However, 
Burks et al. (2011) do find that cognitive ability is correlated with lower present bias, although 
this is merely an association. It is important to keep in mind, that while these correlations are 
important and informative, they are only correlations. For example, Bauer and his colleagues 
did not utilize any econometric technique in order to claim a true causal effect in their 
interpretation, and simply discuss the results as “associations” (2012). Overall, there is evidence 
that present bias is an indicator of certain behaviors, but there seems to be a gap in literature in 
terms of causal determinants of present bias or the changes therein.  
 
2.3  Discount Rates Literature 
In addition to establishing the shape of individuals’ discount functions, researching the 
relationship between time preferences and behavioral outcomes is an important aspect of 
behavioral and development economics. Although an extensive amount of literature has been 
written about time discounting, much of it has been based on laboratory experiments done in 
developed countries; namely the work of Glenn Harrison in Denmark and Uwe Sunde in 
Germany have been significant contributions (Bauer et al, 2012). However, there are also 
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several studies that have conducted field experiments outside of the lab in developing countries 
in order to study subjects’ behavioral choices. These are more in line with the FII experiment 
in Medellin. The results of some of these experiments will be discussed below. As development 
economists, these results are important because they have the potential to provide not only 
descriptive power in terms of why certain people are poor and others are rich, but also can 
implicate specific policy options as preferable over others.  
Through the use of survey and experimental data collection, there has been a wide 
variety of research conducted that aims to assess the role of discount rates in individuals’ 
decision-making. However, this evidence is mixed. There is a lack of consensus in terms 
magnitudes (and sometimes the signs) of the correlations between the characteristics of people 
and their discount rates. The word ‘correlation’ is used here because much of the research 
conducted regarding time preferences cannot claim causality. In other words, a measure of time 
discounting is included in the econometric model as either a dependent or independent variable, 
but no econometric or experimental technique has been utilized to distinguish between a causal 
effect and a correlation that could exist for any number of reasons. In the case of time 
preferences endogeneity, two-way-causality and omitted variable bias, are of particular concern 
(Bauer & Chytilova, 2010). 
Measures of discount rates have been associated with a variety of covariates in 
econometric models. One of the most common indicators that is said to be associated with 
discount rates is income (or wealth). Tanaka et al. (2010) find negative correlations between 
discount rates and income in Vietnam. In other words, the higher one’s income, the lower the 
discount rate (or the higher their level of patience). Interestingly, Anderson et al. (2004) find no 
correlation between income and discount rates, while Kirby et al. finds a negative correlation 
with income but no correlation with wealth accumulation in Bolivia (2002). In their experiment 
in India, Bauer et al also do not find any correlation between income and discount rates (2012). 
However, in Uganda Bauer and Chytilova find a more broad result (as they were not able to 
directly measure income) that individuals who face less income pressures have lower discount 
rates (2010). Overall, the relationship between income and discount rates appears to be mixed.   
Other descriptive characteristics typically correlated with discount rates are age, 
gender, and level of education. In terms of age, Kirby et al. (2002) and find a positive 
correlation with discount rates in Bolivia, as do Bauer and Chytilova (2010) in Uganda. In other 
words, both studies find that people discount faster as they become older. This relationship is 
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consistent with the lifetime income hypothesis, where people are assumed to dynamically 
optimize consumption partially based on their life expectancy (Bauer et al, 2010). However, 
Anderson et al. (2004) find a negative correlation with subjects from Vietnam. In terms of 
gender, Rubalcava et al. find that Mexican women are more patient than their male 
counterparts (2009). Castillo et al. find a similar result with their experimental data on 
elementary school-aged children in the United States (2011). This same result is found in the 
aforementioned studies conducted by Kirby et al (2002) and Bauer and Chytilova (2012) in 
Bolivia and India respectively. However, Anderson et al. (2004) and Bauer et al (2010) find no 
significant difference in discount rates between men and women. The results for education 
levels are also somewhat contentious. Harrison et al. (2002) finds a positive correlation between 
discount rates and education levels among the Danes. Similarly Burks et al. find that levels of 
education are positively correlated with discount rates. However, Kirby et al. (2002) finds the 
opposite in Bolivia. Based on these studies, even the relationship between discount rates and the 
most common control variables appears to be quite ambiguous.  
One likely contributing factor to the lack of consensus regarding discount rates and 
their relationships to the various aforementioned observables is the issue of causality. Perhaps 
all of the mixed results are a symptom of the fact that economists are still striving to be able to 
econometrically determine the direction of causality between economic outcomes and discount 
rates (Tanaka, et al. 2010). One can easily see how a specific discount rate could determine a 
specific economic outcome, like income or level of savings. However, it could be that a specific 
economic situation, like having a low income, determines one’s discount rate. Both scenarios, or 
a dynamic combination of the two, seem plausible. 
Becker and Mulligan’s paper “The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference” is 
most notable for being the first to model how a discount rate is formed, and will be heavily 
relied on to inform the analysis of this research (1997). Their model allows for varying discount 
rates both within and among individuals across time and across different decisions. They also 
suggest that one’s discount rate can permanently change if he or she partakes in any number 
activities that they argue will ultimately adjust how the individual perceives himself and his or 
her future (Becker & Mulligan, 1997). These activities can include setting goals, education, and 
religious practices. This means that the discount rate is not considered to be exogenous, 
predetermined by biology or other factors, but that it can be actively adjusted if an individual 
wishes to do so. They argue that this can be happen when an individual increases the amount of 
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time and money spent on imagining oneself in the future. These imagining and investment 
processes are considered to increase the perceived likelihood of future pleasures, and therefore 
their value increases as well. This analysis can apply to the FII model, in that setting goals and 
working toward their completion could certainly expand one’s imagination of future 
possibilities. 
The notion of intentionally investing in patience to attempt to change one’s discount 
rate is a relatively new research topic within the field, partially because isolating a causal effect 
for time preferences can be quite difficult econometrically. However, examining how one could 
potentially become more patient – like the FII experiment in Medellin – has many development 
implications, as previously discussed. Bauer and Chytilova utilize the analysis from Becker and 
Mulligan’s endogenous time model and state that education can be classified as an investment 
in patience (2010). While education and time preferences theoretically suffer from a myriad of 
endogeneity issues, Bauer and Chytilova are able to examine the causal relationship between 
education and patience due to the use of an instrumental variable technique. Their result is 
consistent with Becker and Mulligan’s endogenous time preference model, and robust to 
various instruments and specifications. They find that more education caused individuals’ 
discount rates to fall, implying more patience, as the endogenous time preference model would 
suggest (Bauer & Chytilova, 2010). The FII research could produce similar results, as aiming to 
achieve goals, seems like a similar investment in patience.  
Truly observing this causal relationship is rare in the literature. Bauer and Cytilova 
state in 2010 that they are not aware of any other study that can fully depart from the observed 
correlation between discount rates and covariates. However, two other studies will be discussed 
here because they at least are able to pin down the direction of causality. They do this are able 
to do this because they evaluate discount rates first, and then measure a subsequent outcome 
and compare those. So, both studies can say with confidence that committing a certain action in 
the future could not affect the discount rates in the past. The first is Burks et al (2011). They 
garner various measures of time preferences and compare those numbers with the attendance of 
a job training program. They use a probit estimation with robust non-clustered standard errors 
to estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the discount rate (subjects become more 
impatient) engenders a lower probability of quitting the difficult job training (Burk et al, 2011). 
Furthermore Castillo et al (2011) use the same technique of exploiting the dynamics to at least 
pin down the direction of causality. They take measures of discount rates with children and 
	   11	  
correlate them with disciplinary referrals the following year. The dependent variable is number 
of disciplinary referrals received, and they find that an increase in impatience is associated with 
an increase in the number of referrals (Castillo et al 2011). The authors choose an OLS 
estimation, clustering standard errors at the school and classroom level. While both of these 
studies are able to pin down the direction of causality simply due to the dynamic nature of their 
data, they are not able to econometrically resolve the possibility of an additional omitted 
variable that is affecting both their impact variables and the outcomes. The FII experiment 
stuffers less from this problem because of the randomization involved, and this is where the FII 
experiment adds to the literature.  
 
2.4  Time Preferences and the FII Model 
As noted by the literature above, there is some evidence that setting goals, receiving 
achievement-based financial incentives, and being in a group could affect subjects’ time 
preferences.  However, each component could affect time preferences differently so it is useful 
to examine each one individually. When looking to the incentive component, the most 
comparable program being implemented in the developing world today is that of the 
conditional cash transfer. In 2009, Rubalcava et al. find evidence that the conditional cash 
transfer program, PROGRESSA in rural Mexico, is a contributing factor to their observations 
that women were more patient than men. This points to the fact that incentives and other 
forms of empowerment (also found in FII) could lead to more patience (Rubalcava et al., 2009).  
When looking to the goal component, a particularly useful study is that by Ida et al 
(2011). Theirs is one of the few studies to take measurements of discount rates pre and post 
intervention like the FII research, rather than ex post or one-time measurements like the vast 
majority of empirical studies (2011). The authors study the effect of discount rates on the 
probability that one will succeed at quitting smoking. They find that discount rate is actually a 
good predictor of success in smoking cessation. More pertinent to this research, they also find 
the reverse effect, where successfully quitting smoking further differentiates the discount rates 
(Ida et al, 2011). So people who succeeded became even more patient and those who failed 
became even more impatient after their respective successes or failures. This is a great indicator 
that goal-achievement programs can indeed affect participants’ time preferences. 
The literature on the relationship between groups and time preferences is somewhat 
lacking. However, Bauer et al. conduct research among micro finance borrowers that are 
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members of self-help groups in India (2012). They find evidence that the women who borrow 
are more present-biased than those who do not, and that the self-help micro finance groups 
actually provide a commitment device (Bauer, et al. 2012). In other words, they find that the 
women who are more present-biased tend to join the self-help group due to it’s required weekly 
payment structures, and that this helps them mitigate the consequences of their present bias. 
This is consistent with a finding in Kenya that suggests that present-biased individuals use the 
social pressure of ROSCAs as a commitment device to save more than they otherwise would 
(Gugerty, 2007). This implies that being part of a group that holds its members accountable, as 
found in FII, can act as a commitment device for people with existing present bias, potentially 
decreasing present bias over time.   
As evidenced by all of the above literature, this research is particularly topical, as there 
exists surprisingly little research that estimates a causal effect of how time preferences are 
formed, and this is especially true in developing countries (Bauer and Chyitlova 2010). The FII 
project is also novel because it is a wholly experimental intervention, where we can control for 
some of the many biases and endogeneity issues found in previous empirical works. 
Additionally, the dynamic evolution of discount rates with respect to economic outcomes, goal-
setting, achievement-based incentives, and group participation has not been studied before in 
this fashion to the researcher’s knowledge. Thus, the results could prove to be a valuable 
addition to this literature, as well as have poignant and useful policy implications for economic 
development.  
3. Methodology and Sample Description 
 
3.1  Context – Medellin, Colombia and Banco de las Oportunidades 
Colombia is located in the Northwestern region of South America, and is considered by 
the World Bank to be an upper-middle income country. However, poverty is a large concern in 
rural areas and among internally displaced populations. The population of the country is just 
under 50 million people, with 45.5 percent of the population below the country’s poverty line 
and 18 percent are living on less than $1.25 per day (UNFPA, 2011). Despite its “upper-middle 
income” classification, the dispersion of income is rather unequal, as the share of income for 
poorest quintile is less than three percent (UNFPA, 2011). The FII experiment was conducted 
in Medellin, the second largest city in Colombia. It is located in the state of Antioquia, which is 
in the northwestern part of the country. It has a population of roughly 2.5 million people, with 
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38 percent of the population living under the poverty line, and ten percent in living extreme 
poverty (Municipality of Medellin, 2010). The city has recently been recognized for it’s 
innovative development programs and acknowledged as a global city on-the-rise (Wall Street 
Journal, 2013; The Guardian, 2012). Thus, Medellin proved to be an ideal place to implement 
the FII model due to its relatively strong institutions and a culture of entrepreneurship.  
The FII experiment was conducted in conjunction with Banco de las Oportunidades, a 
public micro finance institution (MFI) in Medellin. Banco de las Oportunidades is operated by 
the mayor’s office of Medellin, and offers low-income residents of Medellin access to a variety 
of social programs within which to participate. All members of the MFI must live in and 
operate a business in Medellin or it’s various suburbs. The members must be within the bottom 
three (of six) federally designated income brackets, also referred to as strata. Additionally, the 
members must be between the ages of 18 and 64 years of age, and can be either male or female. 
All must have what the MFI considers to be an acceptable credit score, and must not have an 
outstanding loan with any other financial institution or NGO. The majority of the MFI’s 
members participate in at least one of various programs. These programs include solidarity 
groups, microfinance loans, community development centers, a program devoted to local 
artisans, and a program devoted to innovative entrepreneurs.  
 
3.2  Experimental Design 
 One hundred fifty-nine subjects were recruited to participate in the FII experiment, and 
were randomly selected from the database of Banco de las Oportunidades. After consenting to 
participate, the subjects were randomly assigned into five different treatment groups. The 
experiment was designed in such a way that the effect of each component of the FII model – 
groups, goals, and incentives – could be separately observed. Figure 1 is a matrix illustrating 
structure of the experimental design. Every group within the matrix declares a goal and has 
varying group and incentive components. The subjects in Treatment Group II declare goals, 
but do not receive achievement-based incentives, nor are they part of a group. Rather, they 
received a payment each meeting that was equivalent to what we believed would be the average 
payout of those subjects in the achievement-based incentives group (30,000 COP, or roughly 17 
USD). The subjects in Treatment Group III declared goals, and were part of a group. These 
subjects took part in group meetings, discussed their goals, and filled out a survey each 
meeting. They had the same incentive scheme as Group II, as they were both in the “no prize” 
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treatment group, which means they had a non-conditional payment structure. The subjects in 
Treatment Group IV declared goals and were paid based on their achievement of those goals. 
These subjects declared one goal per month, and were paid under the achievement-based 
conditional payment structure. If the subject achieved their declared goal, they were paid what 
amounted to be approximately one day’s wage in Medellin (35,000 COP, or roughly 20 USD). 
If they did not achieve their goal, the subjects were paid enough money to cover their 
transportation costs (5,000 COP, or roughly 3 USD). They were paid based on verifiable 
records of achievement, which were examined at every meeting when the subjects completed a 
survey. The subjects in this treatment group did not attend group meetings, as they were in the 
“no group” treatment. Subjects in Treatment Group V declared goals, were paid by the 
achievement-based conditional payment structure, and participated in group meetings. 
Treatment Group V represents the full FII model, as it contains all three components.  
To hold true to the FII model, all of the subjects in each of the four treatment groups 
(excluding the control groups) met every four weeks. During these monthly meetings, each 
subject was asked to choose a goal to work towards achieving from a predetermined list of 14 
goals provided by the enumerators. The list of goals is shown in Figure 2. In addition to 
choosing a goal, the subjects in each treatment group were asked to report on his or her goal 
achievement from the previous four weeks by filling out a survey of about 20 questions 
inquiring about each of the possible goals. The Goal Survey is provided in Appendix A. At the 
end of each meeting, each subject provided proof of their goal achievement (if applicable), were 
paid according to their level achievement and/or payment structure, and selected a goal to 
work towards for the next four weeks. Depending on treatment group, subjects discussed their 
progress with their group in the monthly meetings as well. There were a total of seven 
meetings in the time period of June through December 2012. Each subject in the four treatment 
groups completed an additional survey at baseline, the mid-point, and at the end of the FII 
experiment. The Baseline, Mid-Point, Endline Survey is provided in Appendix A. This survey 
contains questions regarding the subjects’ self-esteem, risk aversion, reference points, economic 
indicators, social capital, and discount rates.  
Aside from the groups within the matrix, two external control groups, Control Group A 
and Control Group B, were included. The control groups A and B did not declare goals, did not 
receive achievement-based incentives, or attend group meetings. The subjects in each control 
group received a show up fee (25,000 COP, or roughly 14 USD) each time they filled out a 
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survey. The two control groups did not meet monthly, and thus had a different survey schedule 
than the four treatment groups. Control Group A filled out the Goal Survey and the Baseline, 
Mid-point, Endline Survey once in June for the baseline, once at the midpoint, and again in 
December for the endline measurements. The subjects were asked to recall the monthly Goal 
Survey data for each month up until their last meeting, so a balanced panel could be formed. 
Control Group B was surveyed only one time at the endline. These subjects were asked to 
recall the previous six months to answer goal-related questions about their behavior during the 
same timeframe of the FII experiment. The subjects in Control Group B were made aware of 
the dates of various holidays and other notable dates as a tool to assist in accurate responses. 
Again, having six months worth of data on past behavior allows for a balanced panel dataset to 
be formed. This dual control group design was used in an effort to minimize the effect of any 
additional goal achievement of the subjects in Control Group A due to a potential framing 
effect of the survey questions asking about goal achievement outcomes.   
The analysis provided later in this paper relies heavily on the fact that the subjects were 
asked to set goals. Therefore, a more in-depth discussion of this process is warranted. Each 
subject within the four treatment groups was asked to pick a goal from a preset list of 14 goals 
(Figure 2), which was unchanged throughout the experiment. The goals on this list were 
chosen by the researchers for a few important reasons. First, prior to the experiment’s 
inception, focus groups were held during which a survey was administered. The survey asked 
questions such as, “If you could change one thing about your business, what would it be?” The 
topics ranged from business, to home and family life, to the individuals themselves. This survey 
provided a framework around which to base the goals. The second reason these particular goals 
were chosen is that all of them are verifiable. In other words, the researchers were able to think 
of a relatively easy and inexpensive way that the subjects could provide proof that his or her 
goal was achieved. This proof was required in order for the goal to be recorded as achieved. 
Figure 2 illustrates the required verification method for each goal, as well as the relative 
frequencies each goal was chosen. The most frequently chosen goals were to save a certain 
amount per month, to keep accounting of the family business, to attend one of the various 40-
hour courses given by the Banco de las Oportunidades, and to make a payment on an 
outstanding debt.  These, as well as most of the other goals, require planning ahead, a 
contemporaneous sacrifice in order to see some future benefit, and imagining one’s life in the 
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future which is in line with what Becker and Mulligan would consider to be an investment in 
patience (1997).  
As previously mentioned, the subjects’ discount rates were elicited on three separate 
occasions throughout the experiment. This was done via survey using a combination of 
Mazur’s (1987) binary choice protocol and a fill-in-the-blank protocol. On each occasion 
during which discount rates were measured, the subjects were asked to choose between a 
receiving a hypothetical amount of Colombian pesos now, or a larger amount at a time in the 
future. If a subject chose the “now” option, the survey instructs him or her to proceed to the 
following question. The second question has the same initial monetary value, but asks the 
subject to choose between that and an even larger amount of money in the same future period. 
If still the subject chose the “now” option, the survey asks him or her to write down how much 
they would be willing to accept in order for them to wait the designated time period to receive 
payment. This was done for future delays of one, six, and twelve months. There was 
intentionally no front-end delay employed so that the degree of present bias can be evaluated.  
The discount factor for each subject is calculated by subtracting the original amount 
(200,000 COP) from the amount the subject stated he or she would be willing to accept, and 
then dividing by the original amount. This is done so that the discount rate times the amount 
the subject is willing to accept should be equal to the original amount. In other words, it is the 
point at which the subject is assumed to be indifferent between the two amounts, and thus the 
discount factor represents rate at which the subject truly discounts money, or the discount rate. 
For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that the main interests are the differences 
of the time preferences across time and across treatment groups within our sample, and not 
necessarily in the particular absolute values. All of the subjects faced the same protocol, and it 
is feasible to assume that any biases in terms of effort and understanding are not systematic 
across treatment groups, and are consistent within the same individual over the six month time 
period.  
3.3 Sample Description  
Table 1 is a table of summary statistics that indicates some notable characteristics of the 
sample, and shows that the subjects in the treatment and control groups were not significantly 
different from each other at the inception of this study. The table shows that the control group 
started out on average more patient, with less income, more educated, slightly more women, 
and older in age. None of these differences are statistically significant, which shows that the 
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randomization was successful. Thus, any divergence in these variables can arguably be 
attributed to the experimental intervention. However, compared to those in the control, the 
subjects in the treatment groups are significantly (p=0.02) more present-biased. This is not 
ideal but it does mean that if there is a statistically significant decrease in present bias over time 
in the treatment groups, this effect will actually be underestimated. However, it could also 
mean that any small significant effect might not be able to be observed with this data. Some 
additional characteristics of our sample are that 21 percent of the subjects have only an 
elementary school education, 66 percent of the subjects have attended at least high school 
and/or taken courses from a technical or trade school. Only five percent of the subjects are 
illiterate. The average age of participants is 40.4 years. While all of our subjects have their own 
businesses, the most common business types are in the realm of food and beverages (33 
percent), artisan and craft activities (18 percent), and textiles and/or manufacturing (14 
percent). The remaining 35 percent of the subjects’ businesses are split into categories 
including services, technology, trade and commerce, and agriculture.  
It is useful to further examine the baseline levels of discount rates by treatment group, 
income level, education, and gender to inform the interpretations later on in the analysis. 
Present Bias is a function of these discount rates, so it further informs that analysis as well. 
Table 2 illustrates that baseline discount rates by treatment group are not statistically different 
from each other, regardless of how the data is cut. However it should be noted that both the FII 
treatment group variable and the general group treatment variable contain subjects that 
started off more impatient than the rest, significant at the 15 percent level. This will be 
important later on in the analysis section of this model. Additionally, in Table 3 illustrates that 
the males in the sample had higher discount rates at baseline, and that people with an income 
strata of 3 or above also had higher discount rates. The gender difference is consistent with the 
literature, but the lower income brackets having more patience is inconsistent with most 
findings, although neither of these differences are statistically significant. And finally, those 
that have a high school education or less are also more impatient than those who have higher 
than a high school education, which is also significant with the literature, though not 
statistically significant. Again, it can be assumed based on this information that any systematic 
change in the subject’s rates by treatment group can be attributed to the FII experiment.  
Another characteristic of the data is that it can take a panel form. One hundred fifty nine 
subjects total subjects were initially included in the FII experiment, and were asked about their 
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time preferences during three different time periods. This allows for the formation of a long 
panel dataset, which can be used examine each subject i across time t. However, if a subject 
missed either the midpoint or endline meetings, they have a missing value for their discount 
rate for that meeting. A total of 31 subjects missed either the midline or the endline meeting, 
which is nearly one fourth of the total sample. Notably, it is very possible that attrition in the 
FII experiment is correlated with time preferences, which could bias any econometric estimates 
provided by this study. Thus, Table 3 is provided to demonstrate that the baseline time 
preferences of those people who missed a follow up meeting in the FII experiment do not 
significantly differ from those who did not miss any meetings. The t-test comparing the 
discount rate between those subjects that missed one or more of the follow up meetings shows 
that while the people who missed a meeting were on average more impatient at baseline, it is 
not statistically significant. When looking to present-bias, it turns out that those who missed a 
meeting were less present biased than those who did not, though it is also not statistically 
significant. Furthermore, when looking to the lower portion of Table 3, it is evident that the 
number of people who missed at least one of the follow up meetings is fairly consistent across 
group. Based on the results in the table, the attrition rate does not appear to be correlated with 
the dependent variables or the independent variables of interest. Thus, the analysis can proceed 
with the assumption that all missing values are missing as if random. 
 
4. Models, Hypotheses, and Analysis 
 
Based on the analysis provided in studies performed in conjunction with this one, it has 
been established that the subjects in the FII treatment group experienced statistically more 
behavioral and economic changes than those in the other treatment and control groups. Now, 
the next step is to attempt to identify a mechanism through which this is occurring. This 
section will explore several models as ways to explore a change in time preferences as a 
possible mechanism. 
 
4.1  Model 1 – The FII Model and Discount Rates 
Model (1) is meant to answer the first research question: To what extent does 
participating in the FII experiment affect measures of the subjects’ discount rates? As 
mentioned, the dataset is in panel form. However, the data does not meet the assumptions 
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appropriate to run a random effects panel regression, and all of the variables of interest are 
fixed over time, meaning that a fixed effects panel regression would yield zero coefficient 
estimates. Thus, this model is run in Stata as a pooled OLS estimation, with time dummy 
variables and clustered standard errors at the individual level to account for the fact that each 
subject’s error term in one period is likely to be corrated with his or her error terms in the 
other time periods. This is a violation of the OLS assuptions and would lead to biased 
estimates. Using the time dummy variables and clustering the standard errors in this way, the 
model acts as a fixed effects model and, as such, is able to generate a within estimator. Thus, 
the formal model is presented below in reduced form. 
DiscountRate it = β1 Goal it + β2 Groupit + β3 Incentive it + β4 FII it + β5Xit + e it  
In Model (1), the dependent variable is individual i’s discount rate in time t. This is a 
continuous variable and is calculated by survey question with hypothetical payoffs, where a 
higher discount rate represents a lower level of patience. Recall that each subject i has three 
different measures of their discount rate per time t, differing in the length of delay the subject 
has to hypothetically wait to receive their money. To reiterate again, the subjects were asked if 
they would prefer money in the current time period or an increased amount in one, six, or 
twelve months. The rates have all been annualized and averaged so that each subject has one 
discount rate per time t represented in this model, which accounts for potential dynamic 
inconsistency. Furthermore, after examining the distribution of the values of the subjects’ 
discount rates, the residuals, and squared residuals, it has been determined that the errors are 
heteroskedastic and logging the discount rate variable is warranted. This has been done in all 
regressions for Model (1).  
The left-hand side variables of interest are Goal, Group, Incentive and FII. They are all 
binomial dummy variables that take a value of one if the subject is in the treatment group 
corresponding with its name. The FII variable is the interaction of all three. These treatment 
status variables remain constant through the entirety of the experiment. As evidenced by the 
Experimental Design matrix, unless the subject is in Group II, or the Control, he or she will 
have a value of one for at least two of these variables. To avoid multicolinearity and biased 
estimates, the Control Group dummy variable has been left out of the estimation. The X 
represents a vector of individual-specific covariates. Contained in this vector are the variables 
Education, IncomeStrata, Gender and Age. Education is an ordinal variable that can take values 
from zero to six. Zero represents no education and six represents a graduate degree or higher. 
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The variable IncomeStrata represents the number assigned to each individual by the Colombian 
federal government that takes a value between one and six. The government uses these 
numbers to determine how much federal assistance each household receives; one represents the 
lowest level income. Gender is a binomial dummy variable where one is equal to female. Age is 
listed in years.  
 
4.2  Hypothesis 1 – Achievement and Discount Rates 
 Based on the theoretical findings of Becker and Mulligan (1997) and the recent 
empirical findings of Ida et al (2011), Rubalcava (2009), and Bauer and Chytilova (2010), there 
is evidence that the subjects’ discount rates could be affected by participating in the FII 
experiment. Thus the following hypotheses are presented:  
Ho: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0          HA: β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 ≠ 0 
 
4.3  Analysis 1 – The FII Model and Discount Rates 
 Due to the randimization component of the FII experiment, econometric identification 
is fairly straight-forward. In fact, according to Harrison and List (2004), in a controlled 
experiment like the FII experiment, a simple t-test is all that is technically needed in the way of 
identifying a treatment effect. Table 4 shows various t-tests, comparing the average of the 
discount rate meaure by treatment group and the other controls.  When looking at Table 4, 
there are only two statistically significant differences in the means. The first is that of the goal 
treatment, where the people in the goal treatment are statistically more patient than those that 
are not (P=0.04). The second is that those in the FII treatment group (Group V) are on average 
statistically more impatient than those that are not (P=0.005). From the t-tests alone, it 
appears as though the largest effect of the FII experiment on discount rates is actually making 
the subjects more impatient, although it is important to keep in mind that the FII treatment 
group started off more impatient at baseline.  
The regression output can show if the relationship observed by the t-tests holds even 
when including control variables and clustered standard errors. Table 5 shows the results of 
the pooled OLS estimation. It appears the results from the t-tests are robust to control 
variables and the clustering of standard errors. The Goal variable remains negative and 
statistically significant at the ten percent level for all of the estimations except for the final 
where age is included. This supports the result from the t-test that suggest that setting a goal 
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made the subjects more patient. There is no statistically significant impact of Group or Incentive 
on the subjects’ discount rates. However, an interesting result is that the FII variable remains 
positive and statistically significant at least at the ten percent level throughout all estimations. 
This result implies that the subjects in the FII treatment group became more impatient over 
time. Notably, the Age variable is also positive and significant, indicating that the older a 
subject is, the less likely they were to become more patient over time. 
The coefficients in a regression with a logged dependent variable can be somewhat 
tricky to interpret. The coefficient in the final estimation with all controls is 0.75. Because the 
dependent variable in the regression is in log form, the coeffients are interpreted as a 
proportional change in the discount rate, given a one unit increase in the independent variable. 
In the case of the FII coefficient, the interpretation is that being in the FII treatment group 
caused the subjects on average to experience approxamately a 75 percent increase in their 
discount rate. Thus, if the original discount rate of a subject was 100 percent, his or her 
discount rate increased to 175 percent. Similarly if the original discount rate is 50 percent, the 
coefficient is interpreted as a 75 percent increase in his or her discount rate, thus it increases to 
87.5 percent. This of course is an average for those subjects in the FII treatment group only.  
The results so far indicate that setting a goal has a non-significant negative effect on 
discount rates, and that being in the FII treatment group has a significantly positive effect on 
the subjects’ discount rates. This result is unexpected and seems counter-intuitive, and thus 
merits further investigation. Table 6 shows the results from the OLS regressions estimating 
the effect of the treatment groups and control variables on discount rates per time period. 
Ideally this will provide more insight into the evolution of the discount rates over time. The 
final column of Table 6 shows that the FII coefficient only becomes significant in the last 
period. Figure 3 shows the histogram of the discount rates for the subjects in the FII treatment 
group at the endline. It appears that there are some relatively extreme outliers in the right-side 
tail of the distribution, which could be upwardly biasing the linear relationship between the FII 
treatment group and the discount rates. Therefore the results of a new specification will be 
explored.  
Some experimental economists have called into question the comparability of discount 
rates, as people’s perceptions of time differ amongst each other (Thaler, 1981; Luhmann, 2013). 
Furthermore, it is not necessarily the rate itself that is the interest of this research, but rather 
the relative change in patience from the beginning to the end within each subject. Therefore, 
	   22	  
Table 7 presents an alternative estimation to answer the first research question. Rather than 
the dependent variable being discount rates themselves, the dependent variable is now a 
dummy variable called Patience, taking the value of a one if the subject became more patient 
between the baseline and the endline measurements of the discount rates. In other words, if the 
average discount rate decreased from the baseline to endline measurements, the subjects’ value 
of the Patience variable is one. This estimation is also useful because the interpretation of the 
coefficients is more straightforward. It is important to note that most of the coefficients except 
for that of the FII variable have a consistent sign with the estimation in Table 5 (remember 
that a negative discount rate in Table 5 is consistent with becoming more patient in Table 7, a 
positive probability). This indicates that the two estimations are getting at relatively the same 
thing. Table 7 indicates that setting a goal alone makes the subjects more likely to become 
more patient. In the final estimation with all controls, the coefficient of the Goal variable is 
0.141, which indicates that setting a goal made the subjects 14.1 percentage points more likely 
to become more patient over the course of the FII experiment. Until the last estimation, 
Education is positive and significant, which is consistent with the literature.   
 
4.4   Model 2 – The FII Model and Present Bias 
Model (2) is meant to answer the second research question: To what extent does 
participating in the FII experiment affect measures of the subjects’ present bias? As in Model 
(1), the dataset is in panel form, and thus the preferred estimation technique is a pooled OLS 
including dummy variables for time and clustered standard errors at the individual level. The 
formal model is provided below in reduced form:  
PresentBias it = β1 Goal it + β2 Groupit + β3 Incentive it + β4 FII it + β5Xit + e it  
In Model (2), the dependent variable is the measure of subject i’s present bias in time t. 
In this study, present bias is measured by subtracting subject i’s logged discount rate with a 
twelve-month delay from his or her annualized and logged discount rate with a one-month 
delay. If the subject has perfectly consistent time prefernces, the annualized discount rate 
measurement should be the same in both periods, meaning the PresentBias variable will have a 
value of zero. If the subject exhibits present bias, where one is more impatient when presented 
with a choice with a shorter delay and more patient with longer delays, the PresentBias variable 
will be positive and increasing as the difference gets larger. Similarly, if the subject is future 
biased, more patient with a shorter delay and impatient with longer delays, the PresentBias 
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variable will be negative, and increasingly so as the difference between the two measures gets 
larger. This is very similar and consistent with the measurement technique Bauer et al (2012) 
use in their study of present bias among microfinance borrowers in India. The variables of 
interest and the X vector of covariates are the same as described for Model (1).  
 
4.5  Hypothesis 2 – Achievement and Discount Rates 
 As indicated in the literature review, there has yet to be any significant and/or 
consistent empirical finding regarding how present-bias is formed and how it changes over 
time. However, there is evidence that self-help groups are used as a comitment device to hold 
present-biased individuals to commitments that they might not otherwise keep. This indicates 
that perhaps participating in the FII model could affect present bias. With this in mind, the 
following two hypotheses are presented: 
 Ho: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = 0          HA: β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 ≠ 0 
 
4.6  Analysis 2 – Achievement and Discount Rates 
   To begin the analysis of present bias it’s important to show it exists in the first place 
and that it changes over time. Figure 4 demonstrates that there is indeed present bias within 
the data, as it is apparent that the discount rates of the subjects becomes significantly lower as 
the delay gets larger than one month. Richard Thaler (1981) notes that the absolute values of 
the discount rates are not as important compared to the difference between each subject’s 
discount rate for the different delay times. This section explores this relative difference and 
how it changes over time. The analysis will again begin by examining t-tests. These are 
meaningful to the identification strategy due to the randomization component of this study. 
Table 8 shows the various pooled t-tests of the PresentBias variable done by treatment group, 
which are the variables of interest. From this table it can be gathered that both the goal 
treatment and the FII treatment have an effect on the level of present bias. However, the Goal 
variable is associated with a higher level of present bias, and the FII variable is associated with 
a lower level of present bias. Again, we see that these two treatments have the opposite effect 
on time preferences, which is interesting and at least consistent with the discount rate findings.  
Looking to the regression analysis, it is evident that the preliminary results from the t-
tests hold to the addition of control variables, time dummy variables, as well as clustered 
standard errors at the individual level. Table 9 shows the output of the pooled OLS estimation 
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with all of the aforementioned specifications. Again, these results indicate that being in the goal 
treatment group makes one statistically more present-biased, whereas the FII treatment group 
subjects were found to be statistically less present-biased on average. The dependent variable in 
this regression is the difference of two logged discount rates, and thus the coefficients should be 
interpreted as proportional changes in this difference. Thus, the Goal coefficient can be 
interpreted as a 67.4 percent proportional increase in the measure of present-bias, i.e. the 
difference between the one-month and twelve-month delay measures of the discount rates 
overtime. And the FII coefficient can be interpreted as a 52 percent proportional decrease in the 
measure of present-bias.  Table 9 also indicates that the level of income is highly correlated 
with relatively lower levels of present-bias. 
 
5. Discussion, Limitations, and Conclusion 
 
It appears that the effects of setting goals and participating in the full FII model have 
conflicting effects in the majority of the estimations specified in this paper. While at first this 
might seem counter intuitive, this does not necessarily have to be the case. When looking to the 
effect of setting a goal on time preferences, reexamining the Becker and Mulligan (1997) 
endogenous time preferences model is warranted. The authors discuss at length that setting a 
goal, and other forms of imagining one’s future, can increase the perceived likelihood of a 
particular future, thus making the future more valuable. When looking at this in the context of 
the average discount rate, this hypothesis, as well as the empirical evidence found in Uganda by 
Bauer and Chyitlova (2010), is very much consistent with the results presented for Model 1. 
The effect of the goal-setting exercise alone decreased the subjects’ discount rates over time. 
However, how can this be reconciled with the increase in present bias seen in Model 2?  
Recall that the dependent variable for Model 1 is the average discount rate across the 
various delay periods for subject i in time t, and that the relative difference between the one-
month delay discount rate and the one-year delay discount rate is the outcome variable in 
Model 2. Keeping this in mind, perhaps what is actually occurring is that imagining oneself in 
the future (goal-setting) only makes one’s future self more patient. In other words, perhaps the 
one-year delay discount rate is getting lower over time due to setting a goal, but the one month 
stays relatively the same. This would make the overall average lower, and yet the difference 
between the two larger over time. The exact same trend appears to be occurring in the case of 
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the FII treatment group, except in the opposite directions. This indicates that there is 
something about the interaction of setting goals, receiving conditional incentives, and 
participating in a group that decreases the levels of present-bias, but has no effect (or a negative 
effect) on the average level of patience. It appears that the interaction of all there is indeed a 
unique and special combination, yielding results unmatched by any other treatment or control 
group.  
Although the results are interesting and consistent with each other, this study is not 
without it’s limitations. The most glaring limitation is the validity of the measurements of the 
discount rates themselves. The protocol used in this study and slight variations thereof are 
quite common in the time preferences literature. In fact, many economists have done research 
on protocols alone, comparing their relative results. One notable characteristic of the protocol 
used in the FII experiment is that the payoffs are hypothetical. This could lead to misestimation 
of the discount rates if the subjects do not take the choice seriously. For example, in their study 
Cummings et al (1995) find that the hypothetical answers were statistically different from the 
real ones in a non-parametric chi-squared test. Additionally, when conducting a meta-analysis 
of over 29 studies, List and Gallet (2001) find that the preferences elicited by hypothetical 
questions are overstated by a factor of three times the real amount. Another unique aspect of 
this protocol is that it combines the binary choice method and the fill in the blank method. 
Weatherly et al (2011) conduct an experiment that compares the two methodologies with the 
same subjects and finds differences in the discount rates elicited by each method, and that the 
fill-in the blank method typically yields higher discount rates.  
On the contrary, Locey et al (2011) find that hypothetical payoffs produce no different 
results than real payoffs in two different experiments eliciting different measures of discount 
rates. They argue that hypothetical rewards realistically apply to everyday life. Furthermore, 
the subjects were being paid for their general participation in the study, which perhaps 
compelled them to give more careful consideration to the questions than they otherwise would 
have. Also it is important to keep in mind that the absolute discount rates themselves are less 
important. In other words, the values themselves can be seen as arbitrary, as long as the 
relative changes in these values for each subject remain unbiased. As long as there is an 
assumption that each subject was consistent over the course of the study, and a decrease in the 
discount rate from one period to the next truly represents an increase in patience, then the 
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dummy variable estimation and present bias estimations should largely avoid this limitation 
because they highlight the movement within each subject as the outcome variables.  
The success of the FII experiment merits further research. While the mechanism for its 
success does appear to be somewhat through the change in time preferences of the subjects, the 
discovery of further mechanisms remains an important task. If development economists could 
not only understand that FII works, but also exactly how and why it works, replication could 
have serious and positive consequences for the developing world.  Given the findings of this 
study, as well as the other studies conducted in conjunction with the FII experiment, it has 
important policy implications in and of itself. It indicates that a model such as the FII model 
can be used as a relatively cheap tool to inspire the achievement of development-oriented goals, 
speaking to a new model of poverty alleviation. Additionally this study is unique because it is 
one of the few empirical studies that measures the same subjects’ discount rates over time, and 
demonstrates how they can be changed. Thus, continuing to pursue development programs like 
the FII model that can change subjects’ tendencies to be present-biased could have tangible and 
desirable economic outcomes for the world’s poor.  
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Figure 1: Experimental Design 
 
I  Control Groups  Social network 
    A: n=19 
    B: n=21 
 No group Group 
Individual 
Incentives 
No prizes 
II Goals, no prizes, no group 
n= 27 
III Goals, no prizes,  group 
n=32 
Prizes 
 IV Goals, prizes, no group 
n=30 
V Goals, prizes, group 
n=30 
 
	  
Figure 2: List of Goals 
Goal Verification Method Frequency 
Percent 
Chosen 
1 
Attend and complete at least ONE of 
workshops in marketing and sales, 
accounting, administration or 
entrepreneurship offered by El Banco de las 
Oportunidades or your local development 
center (Cedezo) 
Registration 
form and 
certificate of 
completion 
Repeatable 11.11% 
2 Update or create a business plan for your business 
Present 
documents Once 7.24% 
3 
Begin or continue to keep accounting of your 
company or business, and show the gains and 
losses statement 
Present 
accounting 
documents 
Repeatable 16.16% 
4 Pay off an outstanding debt (minimum $ 60,000 Colombian Pesos) 
Receipt (with 
date) 
Once per 
debt 10.77% 
5 
Purchase a machine, tool, or equipment for 
your business (minimum $ 60,000 Colombian 
Pesos) 
Receipt (with 
date) Repeatable 6.06% 
6 
Create and implement a marketing strategy 
for your business (website, social networking 
sites, etc. for those businesses that apply) 
Present 
documents/ 
websites 
Once 9.09% 
7 
Obtain any of the following licenses or 
registrations that you do not currently have 
(only if required for your business): Registry 
with tax board, Operation, Sanitation, Food 
Handling, Public Space 
Present the 
application to 
the enumerator 
and/or group 
Once for 
each 
registration 
5.89% 
 
    
	   31	  
Goal Verification Method Frequency 
Percent 
Chosen 
8 
Participate in a job fair, exhibition, or other 
business event organized by El Banco de las 
Oportunidades or your local development 
center (Cedezo) 
Certificate of 
participation Repeatable 6.40% 
9 
Save at least $ 15,000 (Colombian pesos) 
every week for next four weeks in a savings 
account -- If you do not have a savings 
account, we suggest you open an account in a 
cooperative 
Bank statement Repeatable 20.20% 
10 Make a payment to improve your credit score (minimum $ 60,000 Colombian Pesos) 
Credit score 
data base online Repeatable 1.52% 
11 Purchase a durable good for your home (minimum $ 60,000 Colombian Pesos) 
Receipt (with 
date) Repeatable 4.21% 
12 
Apply yourself or help a member of your 
family apply for at least one of the grants or 
scholarships offered by the municipality for 
higher education  
Present the 
application Once 0.34% 
13 Attend a course for adult literacy (learning to read and write) 
Certificate of 
attendance Repeatable 0.51% 
14 Join the Social Security System (Health and Pension) 
Membership 
certification Once 0.51% 
	  	  
Figure 3: Histogram of FII Treatment Group’s Discount Rates (Endline) 	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Figure 4: Present Bias – Shape of the Discount Function 	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Table 1: Summary Statistics at Baseline: Treatment and Control 
                        Treatment             Control   
     
 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min Max 
 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min Max T-test 
Discount Rate 114 1.7 1.13 -0.98 6.1 
 
19 1.9 1.3 -0.98 4.02 -0.710 
             
Present Bias 114 0.33 0.87 0.17 0.50 
 
19 -0.21 1.24 -0.80 0.39 2.357 
             
Income Strata 116 2.5 0.93 1 5 
 
18 2.39 0.92 1 5 0.547 
             
Education 119 2.29 1.38 0 6 
 
19 2.63 1.21 1 5 -1.031 
             
Gender 119 0.59 0.49 0 1 
 
19 0.53 0.51 0 1 0.5045 
             
Age 119 40.03 11.7 18 67  19 42.6 10.5 26 60 -0.913 	  	  	  
Table 2: T-tests – Baseline Avg. Discount Rates by Treatment 
Mean Mean T-stat P-value 
Goal Treatment 
1.71 
Control 
1.89 -0.71 0.48 
Incentive Treatment 
1.67 
Non-Incentive 
1.78 0.54 0.59 
Group 
1.91 
Non-Group 
1.59 1.56 0.12 
FII 
2.02 
Non-FII 
1.65 1.49 0.14 
High School or Below 
1.78 
Above High school 
1.64 0.67 0.50 
Female 
1.62 
Male 
Mean = 1.88 -1.28 0.21 
Bottom 2 Strata 
1.68 
3 and above 
1.78 -0.51 0.62 
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Table 3: T-test of Time Preferences based on Attrition 
      
Discount Rates Obs. Mean Std. Err. T-stat P-value 
Missed meeting 31 1.89 0.95 0.88 0.38 
Did not miss meeting 102 1.68 1.21 
Present Bias Obs. Mean Std. Err. T-stat P-value 
Missed meeting 31 0.05 0.15 1.41 0.16 
Did not miss meeting 102 0.32 0.15 	  
# of subjects who 
missed a meeting, by 
treatment group 
Control Group2 Group3 Group4 Group5 
6 7 5 7 6 	  	  	  	  
Table 4: T-tests – Pooled Avg. Discount Rates by Treatment 
Mean Mean T-stat P-value 
Goal Treatment 
1.55 
Control 
1.91 -2.09 0.04 
Incentive Treatment 
1.62 
Non-Incentive 
1.6 0.15 0.88 
Group 
1.69 
Non-Group 
1.54 1.32 0.19 
FII 
1.93 
Non-FII 
1.52 2.86 0.005 
Female 
1.54 
Male 
1.72 -1.51 0.13 
Bottom 2 Strata 
1.59 
3 and above 
1.62 0.18 0.85 	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Table 5: Pooled OLS – Average Discount Rate 
VARIABLES 
Discount 
Rate 
Discount 
Rate 
Discount 
Rate 
Discount 
Rate 
Discount 
Rate 
      
Group -0.004 0.036 -0.006 -0.015 -0.056 
 
(0.219) (0.247) (0.246) (0.254) (0.248) 
      Incentive -0.232 -0.211 -0.166 -0.174 -0.227 
 
(0.221) (0.219) (0.209) (0.211) (0.203) 
      Goal -0.441* -0.438* -0.479* -0.466* -0.405 
 
(0.245) (0.252) (0.245) (0.248) (0.245) 
      FII 0.657** 0.621* 0.652* 0.655* 0.750** 
 
(0.313) (0.328) (0.333) (0.335) (0.316) 
      Income strata 
 
0.005 0.072 0.072 0.043 
  
(0.096) (0.092) (0.092) (0.088) 
      Education 
  
-0.109 -0.108 -0.044 
   
(0.083) (0.083) (0.087) 
      Gender 
   
-0.041 -0.014 
        female=1 
   
(0.156) (0.157) 
      Age 
    
0.017** 
     
(0.007) 
      Constant 1.978*** 1.966*** 2.070*** 2.082*** 1.285** 
 
(0.226) (0.324) (0.344) (0.361) (0.537) 
      Observations 356 345 345 345 345 
R-squared 0.063 0.061 0.073 0.073 0.096 
      Clustered (individual level) standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: All regressions include time and meeting location dummy variables 	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Table 6: OLS Regressions by Time Period – Average Discount Rate 
 Baseline Mid-Point Endline  
VARIABLES 
Discount 
Rate 
Discount 
Rate 
Discount 
Rate 
Discount 
Rate 
Discount 
Rate 
Discount 
Rate 
       Group 0.183 0.196 -0.091 -0.142 -0.124 -0.242 
 
(0.307) (0.325) (0.327) (0.349) (0.297) (0.327) 
       
Incentive -0.322 -0.334 -0.154 -0.125 -0.189 -0.132 
 
(0.308) (0.284) (0.343) (0.302) (0.310) (0.280) 
       
Goal -0.299 -0.119 -0.650* -0.692* -0.386 -0.452 
 
(0.349) (0.322) (0.370) (0.354) (0.348) (0.315) 
       
FII 0.541 0.521 0.623 0.708 0.809* 0.952** 
 
(0.431) (0.435) (0.458) (0.438) (0.421) (0.423) 
       
Income strata 
 
-0.056 
 
0.111 
 
0.093 
  
(0.109) 
 
(0.152) 
 
(0.111) 
       
Education 
 
0.132 
 
-0.118 
 
-0.204* 
  
(0.124) 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.113) 
       
Gender 
 
-0.125 
 
-0.019 
 
0.177 
        female=1 
 
(0.224) 
 
(0.240) 
 
(0.195) 
       
Age 
 
0.021* 
 
0.011 
 
0.017* 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
       
Constant 2.013*** 0.918 2.124*** 1.679** 1.908*** 1.445** 
 
(0.285) (0.708) (0.300) (0.695) (0.292) (0.633) 
       Observations 133 133 113 113 110 110 
R-squared 0.051 0.094 0.072 0.107 0.074 0.184 
       Robust standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: All regressions include a meeting location dummy variable 	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Table 7: Pooled Linear Probability Model – Patience Dummy Variable 
VARIABLES 
Patience 
Dummy 
Patience 
Dummy 
Patience 
Dummy 
Patience 
Dummy 
Patience 
Dummy 
 
     
Group -0.047 -0.064 -0.054 -0.058 -0.055 
 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) 
 
     
Incentive -0.051 -0.053 -0.064 -0.067 -0.063 
 (0.059) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063) (0.065) 
      
Goal 0.108* 0.127** 0.139** 0.145** 0.141** 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) 
      
FII 0.070 0.085 0.079 0.080 0.073 
 (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.076) (0.080) 
      
Income strata 
 
0.000 -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 
 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
     Education 
  
0.027* 0.028* 0.023 
 
  
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) 
 
     Gender 
   
-0.018 -0.019 
        female=1 
   
(0.036) (0.037) 
      Age 
    
-0.001 
 
    
(0.002) 
      
Constant 0.393*** 0.367*** 0.339*** 0.344*** 0.398*** 
 (0.064) (0.079) (0.082) (0.083) (0.128) 
 
     Observations 371 360 360 360 360 
R-squared 0.231 0.228 0.232 0.232 0.233 
 
     Clustered (individual level) standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: All regressions include time and meeting location dummy variables 
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Table 8: Pooled T-tests of Present-Bias by Treatment 
Mean Mean T-stat P-value 
Goal Treatment 
0.56 
Control 
-0.03 3.73 0.00 
Incentive Treatment 
0.44 
Non-Incentive 
0.50 -0.46 0.64 
Group Treatment 
0.49 
Non-Group 
0.46 0.28 0.78 
FII 
0.23 
Non-FII 
0.54 -2.31 0.02 	  	  	  
Table 9: Pooled OLS – Present Bias 
VARIABLES 
Present 
Bias 
Present 
Bias 
Present 
Bias 
Present 
Bias 
Present 
Bias 
 
     
Group 0.121 0.040 0.054 0.057 0.047 
 
(0.184) (0.199) (0.203) (0.203) (0.201) 
      
Incentive 0.064 0.100 0.084 0.087 0.076 
 
(0.197) (0.204) (0.202) (0.208) (0.202) 
      
Goal 0.645** 0.650** 0.665** 0.660** 0.674** 
 
(0.276) (0.289) (0.293) (0.299) (0.303) 
      
FII -0.576** -0.530* -0.541** -0.542** -0.520* 
 
(0.258) (0.270) (0.272) (0.273) (0.268) 
      
Income strata  -0.111 -0.134* -0.134* -0.141* 
 
 (0.071) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) 
      
Education   0.038 0.038 0.052 
 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.061) 
      
Gender    0.014 0.019 
     female=1    (0.135) (0.136) 
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Age     0.004 
 
    (0.006) 
      
Constant 0.146 0.402 0.365 0.361 0.190 
 
(0.266) (0.321) (0.331) (0.334) (0.500) 
 
     
Observations 354 343 343 343 343 
R-squared 0.096 0.093 0.095 0.095 0.096 
Clustered (individual level) standard errors in parentheses     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: All regressions include time and meeting location dummy variables 	  
 
 
